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Abstract 
As the extended mind debate came to maturation, it has conceptualized how cognitive 
artifacts extend various memory capacities, including working memory, prospective memory, 
spatial memory, and semantic memory. Surprisingly, the relation between autobiographical 
memory and artifacts has not received much attention in the extended mind literature. In this 
paper, I first distinguish between “cognitive artifacts” used for practical cognitive tasks and 
“evocative objects” used for remembering our personal past. I then go on to describe a 
number of ways in which evocative objects and our autobiographical memory are integrated 
into new systemic wholes, allowing us to remember our personal past in a more reliable and 
detailed manner. After discussing some empirical work on evocative objects and lifelogging 
technology, I elaborate on the dimension of autobiographical dependency, which is the 
degree to which we depend on an object to be able to remember a personal experience. 
When this dependency is strong, we integrate information in the embodied brain and in an 
object to reconstruct an autobiographical memory. In such cases, the information we use to 
remember our personal past is distributed across embodied agents and evocative objects. 
Keywords: Extended mind, Distributed memory, Evocative objects, Cognitive integration, 
Autobiographical memory 
 
1. Introduction 
The paradigm cases in extended and distributed cognition theories focus on the way artifacts 
are integrated into working memory, prospective memory, spatial memory, and semantic 
memory. Examples include making a calculation with pen and paper (Clark 1989), 
remembering quantities of items with a knotted cord (Rowlands 1999), navigating with maps 
(Hutchins 1995), and remembering facts with a notebook (Clark and Chalmers 1998). Such 
uses of external artifacts are adaptive behaviours often enhancing our cognitive capacities, 
making cognitive tasks easier, faster, more reliable, or possible at all. Extended and 
distributed autobiographical remembering, however, seems to be largely absent from the 
literaturei. Whilst extended and distributed autobiographical memory has received significant 
attention in the social psychological theory of transactive memory (e.g., Wegner 1986, Harris, 
Barnier, Sutton & Keil 2014), it is largely overlooked in the debate on the relation between 
cognizers and their artifactual environment.  
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The goal of this paper is therefore to draw attention to artifactual autobiographical 
remembering by discussing empirical work on evocative objects and lifelogging and by 
conceptualizing how such objects and technologies are integrated into biological memory 
processes, thereby changing the structure of our autobiographical memory (Bell & Gemmell 
2009). When interacting with evocative objects, we typically integrate information in the brain 
and in the world to construct an autobiographical memory, thereby allowing us to remember 
our personal past in a way that is quite different from remembering our past without the aid 
of such objects. A particular focus in this paper is on the dimension of autobiographical 
dependency, which is the degree to which we depend on an object to be able to remember a 
personal experience. I will discuss various degrees of autobiographical dependency, ranging 
from low, moderate, and strong. The stronger this dependency, the more likely it is that both 
the vehicles and processes of remembering our personal past are extended and distributed. 
This paper has the following structure. I start with identifying two arguments in favour of the 
extended mind, one based on parity and one on complementarity between an agent and 
external resource, prioritising the latter (Section 2). I then taxonomize different human 
memory systems and briefly describe some of the properties of human autobiographical 
memory (Section 3). Next, I distinguish between cognitive artifacts used for practical cognitive 
tasks and evocative objects used for remembering our personal past, focusing on the latter 
(Section 4). I end this paper with conceptualizing the dimension of autobiographical 
dependency (Section 5) and conduct a case study where the degree of integration between 
agent and lifelogging technology is conceptualized (Section 6).  
2. The extended mind 
Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998) argue that minds and cognitive systems aren’t 
exclusively realized by brains but are sometimes realized by agent-artifact systems. A key 
example is Otto, a man with Alzheimer’s disease using a notebook to remember information. 
Information in the notebook (e.g., an address) plays relevantly similar functional roles as 
information usually stored in semantic memory. The notebook is also easily available, reliable, 
the information in it is trustworthy, and is there because it has been endorsed in the past. It 
would be biochauvinistic, Clark (2008) says, to conceive of the notebook as a mere tool for 
Otto’s biological memory. Instead, we should conceive of the notebook as a proper part of 
Otto’s memory system. Other artifacts that satisfy these conditions (i.e., functional parity, 
availability, reliability, trust, and past endorsement) are, likewise, proper parts of our cognitive 
systems. On this view, the location of the vehicles of cognition is not important for their 
cognitive status. Rather, the functional role they play determines whether they are part of a 
cognitive system. The vehicles of cognitive states and proceses can thus be located outside 
the organism, i.e. in the wider environment (Rowlands 1999; Wilson 2004). The upshot of this 
claim is both ontological and methodological. Ontological, because material culture is (under 
certain circumstances) literally part of the physical supervenience base of minds and cognitive 
systems. Methodological, because to better understand such extended systems, we need to 
enlarge the unit of analysis in the cognitive sciences, studying how agents interact with their 
environment. 
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There are two main arguments in favour of the extended mind, one based on functional 
parity between biological and artifactual resources (Clark & Chalmers 1998, Wheeler 2011) 
and one based on the complementarity between biological and artifactual resources (Menary 
2007, Sutton 2010; for a recent overview of these two arguments see Gallagher 2018). Parity-
based arguments have been criticized as empirically implausible as the informational 
properties and functions of cognitive artifacts are often quite different from those of internal 
states and processes (Menary 2007; Sutton 2010; Heersmink 2015). Complementarity-based 
extended mind theory recognizes the differences between biological and artifactual resources 
in term of their informational properties, dynamics, and functions. If an artifact is to provide a 
cognitive benefit for an agent, it often has properties that the biological cognitive system of 
the agent lacks. We use a cognitive artifact when we cannot perform the task ourselves, i.e., 
without the aid of an artifact.  
Such artifacts with complementary properties and functions are integrated into biological 
cognitive systems to varying degrees. By synthesising work of Clark and Chalmers (1998), Rob 
Wilson and Clark (2009), John Sutton (2010), and Kim Sterelny (2010), (Heersmink 2015) has 
suggested that the degree of integration between an agent’s cognitive system and an 
environmental resource depends on a number of dimensions. These dimensions include the 
intensity of information flow, accessibility of the resource, durability of the relation between 
agent and artifact, trustworthiness of the information the artifact contains, procedural 
transparency or ease of use, informational transparency or level of informational 
understanding, and the degree of personalization. Such dimensions are matters of degree 
and describe certain properties of the cognitive relation between an embodied agent and an 
external resource. The higher an agent-artifact system scores on these dimensions, the 
tighter the integration between the agent’s cognitive system and an artifact, thereby 
increasing the extendedness and distributedness. This multidimensional framework can be 
used to perform case studies of specific cognitive artifacts, conceptualising the degree of 
integration (for discussion see Heinrich 2018). It is, however, not always easy or even possible 
to demarcate clearly between the embedded and extended cases. The relations between 
embodied agents and artifacts can vary along many dimensions and are thus quite complex. 
For this reason, there is a grey area in between the paradigm cases of embedded and 
extended systems in which it may not always be clear whether a system is embedded or 
extended. 
In the previous 25 years or so, the extended mind and the more empirically oriented 
distributed cognition framework have developed into a robust and extensive research 
paradigm in philosophy and cognitive science, departing from the traditional internalist view 
on mind and cognition (for an overview see Michaelian & Sutton 2013). Theorists working in 
this paradigm, broadly construed, have analysed the relation between human cognitive 
systems and various cognitive artifacts, including maps, navigation systems, diagrams, 
notebooks, (scientific) models, (scientific) instruments, software programs, computer systems, 
and many more cognition-aiding artifacts. Artifacts supporting autobiographical remembering 
are notably lacking from this literature (but see Sutton 2009a; Clowes 2013, 2015). One 
possible explanation for the lack of focus on artifactual autobiographical remembering in the 
extended mind debate is that extended mind theorists are mainly concerned with practical 
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cognitive tasks such as navigating, calculating, problem-solving, etc. In this sense, the 
extended mind is a view on human beings as adaptive problem solvers and as active agents 
acting in and on the world. While I agree with this anthropological view, there is no reason at 
all why the thesis, including the ontological and methodological commitments, shouldn’t 
extend to autobiographical memory capacities.  
Interestingly, because autobiographical memory has identity-constituting functions, arguing 
that autobiographical memory is extended and distributed pushes the extended mind thesis 
into debates about identity and self (see also, e.g., Malafouris 2008; Milojevic 2020; Heersmink 
2018, 2019; Piredda & Candiotto 2019; but compare Wilson & Lenart 2014). Likewise, because 
autobiographical memories often have affective components, arguing that autobiographical 
memory is extended and distributed also pushes the extended mind thesis into debates 
about (extended) emotion and affect (e.g., Carter, Gordon & Palermos 2016; Krueger & Szanto 
2016; Colombetti & Roberts 2015). The extended autobiographical memory thesis can thus 
build novel bridges to other fields in philosophy and psychology. Finally, whilst other animal 
species use environmental structures to aid their cognition (Cheng 2018), using objects to 
remember one’s personal past is a possibly unique form of human cognitive tool-use. Some 
animals, for example, use scent trails to navigate, but to the best of my knowledge, there is no 
literature on animals using objects to remember their personal past. 
3. Autobiographical memory 
Before describing some of the properties of autobiographical memory, it is helpful to place it 
in a broader context by briefly taxonomizing human memory into various subsystems (Squire 
2009) (see figure 1 below). A first distinction is between short-term and long-term memory. 
Most people can keep approximately 4 to 5 items in their short-term memory (also known as 
working memory) for several seconds up to a minute. Working memory is used during many 
tasks such as reading, calculating, navigating, cooking, conversing, and problem-solving, 
thereby playing a central role in many our cognitive activities. Long-term memory is divided in 
declarative and non-declarative memory. Declarative memories can be articulated, whereas 
non-declarative memories typically remain under the threshold of consciousness and have to 
do with performing procedural tasks like driving a car or tying your shoelaces.  
Declarative memories, in turn, are also divided in two categories, namely semantic and 
episodic. Semantic memories are memories of general knowledge and facts, for example 
remembering that Canberra is the capital of Australia. Episodic memories are memories of 
one’s past actions, thoughts, feelings, and experiences, for example remembering having a 
really spicy curry when you were in Canberra last week. When we remember our past 
episodically we reexperience a past event. With reexperience I mean figuratively travelling 
back in time and reconstructing an experience, typically involving a visual component (Tulving 
1985, 2002). Episodic remembering thus has a distinct phenomenology that is lacking in 
semantic memory. 
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Figure 1. A taxonomy of human memory systems. The focus in this paper is on how evocative 
objects extend semantic and episodic memory systems, thereby allowing us to remember our 
personal past in a more detailed and reliable manner.  
Our personal past can be remembered semantically and episodically. I therefore prefer the 
more general term of autobiographical memory to the more specific term of episodic 
memory. Episodic memories are experiential memories of specific episodes, whereas 
autobiographical memory also includes propositional/semantic memories of our personal 
past such as knowing that I went to the office two weeks ago without having specific 
experiential memories of being there. Autobiographical memory is thus a broader category 
than episodic memory. I will be neutral about whether autobiographical memory is a distinct 
system or composed of multiple systems, but I lean towards the latter. Following Kirk 
Michaelian (2016), I will use autobiographical memory as a capacity to remember our 
personal past. 
Human autobiographical memory is not like an archive in which specific memories are stored 
and then later retrieved with the exact same content (Schechtman 1994; Sutton 2009b; 
Brockmeier 2015). Instead, the contents and valences of autobiographical memories change 
over time. Detail is lost and every time a memory is retrieved it is reconstructed and restored 
with a slightly different content. This is consistent with a connectionist view on memory. 
Connectionism suggests that memory traces are stored across a pattern in the units of a 
network (Sutton 1998). The connection weights between the units (i.e., neurons) store the 
content of the memory trace. Traces for different memories are not stored separately and 
isolated from each other but share some of the weights between the units. James McClelland 
and David Rumelhart put it as follows:  
“We see the traces laid down by the processing of each input as contributing to the 
composite, superimposed memory representation. Each time a stimulus is processed, 
it gives rise to a slightly different memory trace - either because the item itself is 
Long term 
Declarative Non-declarative 
Semantic Procedural Episodic 
Facts Skills/Habits 
Short term 
Memory 
Experiences 
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different or because it occurs in a different context that conditions its representation - 
the traces are not kept separate. Each trace contributes to the composite, but the 
characteristics of particular experiences tend nevertheless to be preserved, at least 
until they are overridden by cancelling characteristics of other traces. Also, the traces 
of one stimulus pattern can coexist with the traces of other stimuli, within the same 
composite memory trace” (1986, p. 193, quoted in Sutton 2009b). 
Over time, the connection weights can be weakened and some of the content of the memory 
trace may then be lost. Importantly, because biological memory is malleable and changes 
over time, we need the informational stability provided by the artifactual environment to 
reliably remember our personal past (Sutton 2009b). Information in objects such as photos 
usually remains fixed and we can lock on to that information at various times in our lives to 
use the stability, detail, and reliability of such objects to remember our past. Importantly, 
when using informational objects to remember our past, we don’t retrieve and reconstruct a 
complete internal memory, rather information in the brain and in the object is integrated as 
to reconstruct an autobiographical memory. In this sense, the information we use to 
remember our personal past is distributed across embodied brains and the environment. 
Lastly, autobiographical memory intersects with evaluative and affective systems in at least 
two ways (Holland & Kensinger 2010). First, the way we currently feel influences the types of 
memories we retrieve and reconstruct. When we feel positive, we tend to retrieve more 
positive memories, and when we feel negative we tend to retrieve more negative memories. 
This phenomenon is referred to as “mood-congruent memory”. We look back on our past 
differently when feeling nostalgic, moody, or content. So, we look at our personal past 
through the affective lens of the present. Second, evaluative and affective states can be part 
of the content of an autobiographical memory. It’s not the case that we first construct an 
autobiographical memory and then have an emotional response to it. Instead, the cognitive 
and affective components are interwoven. Some of our personal memories are affectively 
neutral and lack any phenomenology (e.g., that you went to the supermarket last week), 
whereas others are imbued with existential meaning, affect, and may have a rich 
phenomenology (e.g., your PhD graduation). So, when we retrieve an affectively-laden 
autobiographical memory, it can make us feel a certain way. Remembering your father’s 
funeral, for example, may cause you to feel sad, but remembering that city trip to Barcelona 
makes you feel joyful. 
4. Evocative objects and lifelogging 
In this section, I propose a distinction between “cognitive artifacts” and “evocative objects”. A 
cognitive artifact is a material object or structure that functionally contributes to performing a 
practical cognitive task such as navigating, calculating, planning, decision-making, and 
problem-solving (Heersmink 2016; Fasoli 2018). Examples of cognitive artifacts include maps, 
labels, abacuses, diaries, indexes, search engines, diagrams, models, and computer systems. 
Using such external artifacts often enhances our cognitive capacities, making cognitive tasks 
easier, faster, more reliable, or possible at all. Such artifacts have informational properties 
and functions that complement those of the embodied brain and have been the focus of most 
extended mind theorizing.  
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An evocative object, by contrast, is an object or structure that intentionally or unintentionally 
aids us in remembering our personal past (Turkle 2007; Heersmink 2018; Heersmink & 
McCarroll 2019; for discussion see Piredda 2020). Examples include photos, videos, souvenirs, 
postcards, concert tickets, journals, books, works of art, trophies, inherited objects, shells 
found on the beach, and many other mementos. Interacting with such objects activate 
cognitive processes that reconstruct and retrieve the contents of personal memories into 
consciousness. This is sometimes done intentionally, for example when we browse through 
our photos on our smartphone or computer. But it also happens unintentionally, for example 
when packing a suitcase, it may unexpectedly remind us of a previous holiday. A photo is 
autobiographically meaningful because it is representational, whereas the suitcase is 
autobiographically meaningful because of an accidental association between the object and a 
memory. The evocative powers of objects can thus come about through both 
representational and non-representational properties. 
The boundaries between these two categories of material culture are fluid and porous. The 
abacus I used in elementary school to learn to calculate may now function as an evocative 
object to remind me of my time as a schoolchild. A cognitive artifact can also simultaneously 
be an evocative object, being a member of both categories. For example, someone’s 
notebook/journal may contain autobiographical descriptions about past events and 
experiences but may also contain semantic information used to plan a future work trip. The 
distinction between cognitive artifacts and evocative objects is thus perhaps best understood 
as different ways of using information, rather than as strict categories of artifacts.  
More specifically, the distinction is about which types of cognitive processes the artifact or 
object contributes to or extends. Cognitive artifacts contribute to practical cognitive tasks 
such as navigating, calculating, planning, decision-making, and problem-solving, whereas 
evocative objects contribute to autobiographical remembering. In this sense, an evocative 
object is still a cognitive artifact, in that it contributes to cognitive processes. However, 
because autobiographical remembering is a distinct type of cognitive process, objects 
contributing to this process have an existential and sometimes affective dimension that is 
lacking in regular cognitive artifacts. Importantly, because autobiographical remembering 
plays a central role in maintaining our narrative identity (Schechtman 1994), I think evocative 
objects are a unique sort of cognitive artifact, deserving their own label. There is interesting 
recent work done on “affective artifacts”, which “are tentatively defined as objects that have 
the capacity to alter the affective condition of an agent, and that in some cases play an 
important role in defining that agent’s self” (Piredda 2020, p. 549). Some (but not all) evocative 
objects can be seen as affective artifacts, as they can alter the affective state of the agent. 
Evocative objects can aid us in remembering our personal past in a way that is quite different 
from remembering our past without the aid of such objects. When thinking back to my 2018 
holiday in Lombok, Indonesia, I know that and when I went to Lombok and I’m able to retrieve 
a few specific episodic/experiential memories. However, when browsing through my digital 
photo album containing over a hundred photos, I’m not just able to recall many more 
experiences and events but I can do so with much more detail, reliability, and in a more 
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chronologically accurate manner. In this sense, interacting with evocative objects can thus 
enhance autobiographical memory processes.  
An important technology to create evocative objects are SenseCams (Hodges, et al 2006). 
These are small wearable cameras worn around one’s neck with a lanyard, designed to help 
people capture and remember their daily activities. SenseCams have an ultra-wide angle lens, 
maximizing the amount of information captured by the camera. It automatically takes photos 
without the agency of the user when its internal sensors detect a change in environmental 
conditions (e.g., light intensity, GPS location), but also has a trigger button that can be used to 
take a photo. These photos are uploaded onto a computer and viewed using a simple 
interface. Since their introduction in 2006, SenseCams have been used by cognitively healthy 
people and people with memory disorders like dementia and amnesia. These devices are 
often used by lifeloggers, which are people who use technology to record and store 
information about their activities into a lifelog (Bell & Gemmell 2009). This recent trend in 
lifelogging is becoming increasingly popular across all demographic groups (Lupton 2016) and 
is one of the most powerful tools for augmenting human autobiographical memory.  
Gordon Bell and Jim Gemmell, computer scientists and pioneers in lifelogging, predict that 
lifelogs “will become vital to our episodic memory. As you live your life, your personal devices 
will capture whatever you decide to record. Biomemories fade, vanish, merge, and mutate 
with time, but your digital memories are unchanging” (Bell and Gemmell 2009, p. 57). So, 
because human biological memory is malleable and prone to changing over time, lifelogs can 
provide the stability, detail, and reliability as to remember our past in a more reliable and 
detailed manner. Bell and Gemmell’s approach to lifelogging is characterized by a “total 
capture” of our lives and a “total recall” of our personal past. Their goal is to build a lifelog that 
contains as much information as possible about one’s personal past. However, one may 
wonder whether this is the right way to do it (Sellen & Whittaker 2010). Human 
autobiographical memory is selective for a reason: we don’t need to remember our entire life 
in great detail as it would clutter our memory system. We remember our past in terms of an 
unfolding narrative, which is not like a film we can play back in detail but only contains a 
number of self-defining experiences (Schechtman 1994). Bell and Gemmell’s “total capture” 
and “total recall” approach runs the risk of cluttering our external memory. Rather, we need to 
construct a lifelog that selectively supports important autobiographical memories (Crete-
Nishihata, et al. 2012).  
5. Autobiographical dependency 
Having outlined complementarity-based extended mind theory, described some of the 
properties of autobiographical memory, and discussed some research on evocative objects 
and lifelogging, I will now continue with presenting the dimension of autobiographical 
dependency. This will help us in better understanding the integration between biological 
memory systems and evocative objects. This dimension can be characterized as the degree to 
which we depend on an evocative object to be able to remember a past event or experience. 
To better understand the underlying conceptual structure of this dimension, two elements 
are relevant: (1) the cognitive profile of the embodied agent and (2) the informational and 
functional properties of the evocative object. The degree of autobiographical dependency 
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emerges out of the interaction between these two elements. Autobiographical dependency 
can be seen as a spectrum and below I discuss three points on this spectrum, which I 
characterize as low, moderate, and strong.  
When autobiographical dependency is low, we can still relatively easily remember the 
experience or event without needing an evocative object to aid our memory. For example, the 
day after our PhD graduation ceremony, episodic/experiential memories of the event are still 
vivid and detailed, in part because the event is recent and in part because it is emotionally 
significant. At this point in time, we don’t need to look at photos or videos of the event in 
order to be able to remember it, although viewing photos or videos may fill in some details we 
missed. We can still clearly remember the gist of the dean’s speech, who was there with us, 
what the theatre looked like, how long the event took, how we felt emotionally, how 
uncomfortable the academic gown felt, where we went for dinner afterwards, etc. In most 
cases, the more recent a memory, the easier it is to remember. But as time passes, we often 
lose detail in our episodic/experiential memories.  
Cognitive psychologists distinguish between a memory being available and accessible (Tulving 
& Pearlstone 1966). When a memory is available, it is consolidated and stored in the brain. 
When it is accessible, we are able to retrieve and reconstruct the contents of the memory into 
consciousness. Sometimes memories are available but not accessible. This happens to all of 
us, for example when we experience the tip-of-the-tongue-phenomenon. Inaccessibility of 
memories happens most often with people suffering from memory disorders like dementia or 
amnesia who may have difficulty activating retrieval processes. So, availability has to do with 
storage systems, whereas accessibility has to do with retrieval systems. When 
autobiographical dependency is low, memories are both available and easily accessible, and 
so we don’t need evocative objects to aid our recall. Over time, though, the availability 
decreases, as the strength of the connection weights in the neural networks may weaken.  
Autobiographical dependency is moderate when we can still remember parts of the event or 
experience but need to interact with an evocative object to have a fuller, more detailed 
memory of the event. Some years after our PhD graduation ceremony, we may be able to 
retrieve a number of specific episodic/experiential memories. Perhaps we can still remember 
the more emotionally salient features of the experience and event such as who was there 
with us and the sense of pride and accomplishment we felt, but we may not be able to 
remember less salient details anymore such as the dean’s speech, what the theatre looked 
like, and where we went for dinner afterwards. However, when we look at the photos and 
video of the event, those parts of the event may come back to us and we may reexperience 
them. When autobiographical dependency is moderate, memories may have lost some of 
their detail and so the availability is somewhat diminished, and the memories may also be 
less easily accessible. In such cases, evocative objects may help us in recalling the personal 
past by proving information that is no longer available in the brain. 
When autobiographical dependency is strong, we need to interact with an evocative object in 
order to remember an event or experience. Many years after our PhD graduation ceremony, 
our episodic/experiential memories of the event will most likely be (very) weak. Perhaps we 
may not have any episodic/experiential memories of the event at all, but only remember that 
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we had a PhD graduation ceremony. However, when looking at the photos and videos of the 
event, some of the details may come back to us. When autobiographical dependency is 
strong, memories may have lost most, if not all, of their detail and emotional content, in which 
case the availability is quite diminished and the content that is still there may be difficult to 
access. In such cases, we need an evocative object to be able to retrieve an autobiographical 
memory, suggesting that when interacting with such evocative objects both the vehicles and 
processes of remembering our personal past are distributed across the embodied agent and 
the evocative object. In such cases, evocative objects don’t merely trigger a complete 
biological memory but contribute to reconstructing a memory by combining information 
stored in connectionist networks in the embodied brain and in an evocative object. The 
stronger the dependency, the more the equilibrium of information-storage shifts towards the 
artifactualii. 
Autobiographical dependency typically increases when trying to remember an event that is 
deeper in our past, as the memory trace may decay over time. It also increases when people 
have memory disorders like dementia or amnesia. For example, people with anterograde 
amnesia have an inability to properly consolidate new autobiographical memories, which 
often happens after an accident or brain damage. Such patients can use evocative objects to 
aid them in remembering their activities. Rather than storing personal memories in their 
brain, they can store these in a lifelog by using a SenseCam (Loveday & Conway 2011). 
Consider Patrick Jones, an extreme case of autobiographical dependency, described by Gary 
Marcus (2008). Jones, who suffers from a severe form of anterograde amnesia, uses Evernote 
(a program allowing him to make and access notes) and Curio (a mind mapping program 
allowing him to draw connections between interconnected thoughts) on his mobile 
computing device and desktop computer. He uses these software programs to create a lifelog 
of his past activities, including notes about what he’s has done and who he talked to and why. 
Jones’ improvised lifelogging system plays a key role in his autobiographical memory and 
cognitive life more generally (Clowes 2013).  
In his case, retrieving an autobiographical memory from his lifelog lacks an 
episodic/experiential component. Because his episodic memory is so damaged due to a brain 
injury, he can’t consolidate and retrieve an experience. Instead, retrieving information from 
his lifelog is purely semantic, providing knowledge-that about his past. Jones’ autobiographical 
dependency on his lifelogging system is extremely strong. He can’t consolidate new memories 
in his brain and therefore needs lifelogging technology to perform this function for him, 
literally substituting his memory systems.  
6. Agent-lifelogging systems  
We’ve now looked at autobiographical dependency, but how do some of the other dimensions 
of integration mentioned in section 2 (such as information flow, accessibility, durability, trust, 
procedural transparency, informational transparency, and personalization) come into play 
when using lifelogs? In this section, I will do a brief case study where each dimension is 
ranked in terms of three categories: low, medium, and high. When users interact with their 
lifelogs, the information flow is two-way: they upload information (videos, photos, notes, GPS 
locations, etc.) into their lifelog and then retrieve it at some later point. Accessibility is high as 
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lifelogs are typically stored in the cloud and can be accessed on a variety of computing 
devices, including wearable devices like tablets and smartphones. Durability is medium to 
high as most lifeloggers spend quite some time interacting with their lifelog, they frequently 
couple with their lifelog and will do so over a long period of time (Bell & Gemmell 2009). Trust 
is high as the contents of the lifelogs are uploaded by the user, the user therefore knows the 
information to be true and thus trustworthy. There is usually no reason to distrust the 
information in one’s lifelog, it is accepted without consciously evaluating it.  
Procedural transparency is typically high as the devices and software programs allowing one 
to browse through the contents of one’s lifelog are easy to use. But this does depend on the 
design of the particular interface, some users have reported that it is difficult to find the right 
entry, as some lifelogs have more than a million photos (Caprani, O’Connor & Gurrin 2013). 
But much progress is being made in interface design (e.g., Lee, et al 2008). Informational 
transparency is high as interpreting the contents of lifelogs is relatively straightforward, 
mainly because the information is about one’s own life and experiences, and is created by the 
user him or herself.  
Personalization is high as the lifelog contains information pertaining to the user’s life and 
experiences, lifelogs are probably one of the most personalized technologies. Also, lifelogs are 
actively edited which involves deleting irrelevant information and selecting relevant 
information, which further increases the personalization. For some users, lifelogs may 
become entrenched, meaning that the user and object transform each other’s properties: the 
information in the lifelog may create insights into one’s behaviour (e.g., realizing that one is 
not exercising enough) that may lead to changes in those behaviours. Autobiographical 
dependency is typically medium, but this depends on the particular entry one is viewing in the 
lifelog. If it concerns an entry representing a recent event, it is likely that the user may still be 
able to remember the event without viewing the entry. But if it is an event deeper in the past 
or one that is less emotionally salient, then it may be the case that the user would have 
difficulty remembering the event without using the lifelog (Sellen, et al 2007). 
When artifacts are highly personalized, which is the case with evocative objects and lifelogs, 
we often trust them more. “When one trusts external informational sources, one grants them 
a similar cognitive status as one’s own memory and other internal cognitive resources” 
(Nguyen forthcoming, p. 23). Given that photos and lifelogs are often more reliable than 
biological memory, it is rational to put a lot of trust in the contents of one’s lifelogs. We don’t 
consciously evaluate the contents of our lifelogs but automatically accept them as true. Our 
default disposition is not to question the truth-value of the information in our lifelog but 
implicitly accept it as true. This is so because if information is included in our lifelog, then it 
must be about an event we experienced ourselves.  
Overall, then, lifelogs rank high on most dimensions and are thus deeply integrated into the 
memory systems of their users, suggesting that both the vehicles and processes of 
remembering our personal past are distributed, in that way constituting a new systemic 
whole. To better understand such new systemic wholes, we need to enlarge the unit of 
analysis in the study of autobiographical remembering and focus on agent-object 
interactions. Lifelogging technologies and other wearable computing devices have all the 
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hallmarks of extended and distributed cognitive systems. Clark points out that: “As we move 
towards an era of wearable computing and ubiquitous information access, the robust, reliable 
information fields to which our brains delicately adapt their routines will become increasingly 
dense and powerful, further blurring the distinction between the cognitive agent and her best 
tools, props and artifacts” (2007, p. 275). As the recent trends in lifelogging, mobile computing, 
and artificial intelligence continue and converge, it will result in new applications that will be 
easier to use, are more personalized, and more computationally powerful. The cognitive 
functions of such computational artifacts and systems will be integrated deeper into a 
broader spectrum of our cognitive capacities, including our capacity to remember our 
personal past. 
At this point, a critic might ask: why should resources that are deeply integrated into the 
memory systems of their users, be seen as constitutive parts of those systems, rather than as 
merely casually integrated to prompt or cue memories? There are two possible responses to 
this criticism, related to both semantic and episodic memories. First, when the 
autobiographical dependency is high, semantic memories can be stored in external media 
without triggering a biological memory. The information in Jones’ lifelog, for example, is not 
also stored in his brain, rather it is stored only in the lifelog because he has difficulty 
consolidating new memories in his brain. For this reason, the information in the lifelog doesn’t 
trigger an internal memory but literally is Jones’ memory. So, the information in his lifelog is 
part of the physical system that realizes some of his memories, which thus supervene on the 
Jones-plus-lifelog system. 
A reviewer noted that Jones doesn’t recognise the retrieved memory as his, which undermines 
the status of external memory as real memory. My view is that it’s more important how the 
external memory is caused, rather than recognising it as our own. I support a liberal version 
of the causal theory of memory. The causal theory of memory claims that biological memory 
traces need to be caused appropriately by an experience (Martin & Deutscher 1966; 
Bernecker 2008, 2010; for discussion see Robins 2016). On this view, an experience needs to 
be consolidated in a biological trace for it to count as memory. This causal condition allows us 
to distinguish real memory from imagining or confabulating.  In Jones’ case, he has an 
experience which is first temporarily stored in his short-term memory and then offloaded 
onto his lifelogging system. So there is still a relevant causal link between an experience and 
an external memory. Why would it matter where the trace is stored, if it is caused by the 
person in the right sort of way. So, a more liberal reading of the causal condition might 
include external memories as real memories (see also Sutton & Windhorst 2009). 
Jones is of course an extreme example, but many of us store and rely on semantic memories 
in artifacts that aren’t also stored in our own biological memory. We may sometimes look up 
an appointment in our diary without remembering putting it in there or we may read an entry 
in our journal about a past event that we completely forgot. So, the capacity to semantically 
remember our personal past doesn’t always involve triggering internal memories, rather 
sometimes semantic memories are only stored in the environment. In extreme cases like 
Jones’, lifelogging technology has substituted his biological memory processes altogether. His 
biological memory is so poor that technology has fully replaced the encoding, storage and 
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retrieval capacities usually done by biological memory systems. Semantic memories, then, 
aren’t triggered in biological memory but are fully constituted by information in artifacts. 
Second, when the autobiographical dependency is high, an object goes beyond merely 
triggering a fully formed episodic memory. Rather, the information it contains helps to 
reconstruct an episodic memory in a way that is not possible without the object. As we’ve 
seen, when the autobiographical dependency is low, memories are both available and easily 
accessible, and so we don’t need evocative objects to aid our recall. But when 
autobiographical dependency is strong, biological memories may have lost most, in some 
cases perhaps all, of their detail and emotional content, in which case the availability is quite 
diminished and the content that is still there may be difficult to access. Evocative objects such 
as (SenseCam) images can aid us in accessing what is still stored and to use the information in 
the brain and information in an object to reconstruct a much fuller memory with more detail, 
thereby allowing us to remember our personal past in a way that is quite different from 
remembering our past without the aid of such objects (Loveday & Conway 2011). In such 
cases, evocative objects don’t merely trigger a fully formed biological memory but contribute 
to reconstructing a memory by combining information stored in connectionist networks in the 
brain and in an evocative object.  
Let me end this paper with a brief normative note. Socrates worried that writing restructures 
our biological memory in undesirable ways, arguing that when we can write things down, we 
won’t store them in our brain, resulting in less knowledgeable thinkers. Like many other 
memory technologies, it is very likely that evocative objects restructure the biological memory 
systems and processes of their users. Knowing that lifelogs provide reliable access to 
trustworthy and detailed information about one’s past activities may result in consolidating 
that information less strongly in the brain, increasing the autobiographical dependency. Linda 
Henkel (2014) has performed a study showing that when people take photos of museum 
objects, they have less detailed memories of those objects as compared to people who didn’t 
take a photo of the object. The process of taking a photo thus interferes with attentional 
processes which has downstream effects on encoding, consolidating, and retrieving. If 
lifelogging becomes more prevalent in the (near) future, a new equilibrium between biological 
and artifactual autobiographical memory may come about, one in which information-storage 
shifts slowly towards the artifactual (Heersmink 2017). Further philosophical and ethical 
analysis can contribute to better understanding this process, allowing us to develop a relation 
to evocative objects and lifelogging that is consistent with our personal, moral, and cultural 
values. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, I argued that autobiographical memory is extended and distributed across 
embodied brains and evocative objects. When interacting with evocative objects, we typically 
integrate information in the brain and in the world to reconstruct an autobiographical 
memory, thereby allowing us to remember our personal past in a way that is quite different 
from remembering our past without the aid of evocative objects. The more we depend on 
objects to remember our personal past, the more the equilibrium of information-storage 
shifts towards the artifactual, and the deeper they are integrated into our biological memory 
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systems. Conceptualizing autobiographical memory as extended and distributed extends the 
thesis into debates about identity, self, and emotion, and allows us to better understand a 
possibly unique form of human cognitive tool-use. It is thus a fruitful topic for further 
exploration.  
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i An elaborate Google Scholar search with the phrases “extended mind and autobiographical memory”, 
“extended mind and episodic memory”, “extended distributed cognition and autobiographical 
memory”, “extended distributed cognition and episodic memory” resulted in one article (Clowes 2013) 
that mentions the possibility of artifact-extended autobiographical memory in passing and one chapter 
(Sutton 2009a, see also 2009b) that elaborates on the notion in more detail by suggesting that Leonard 
in the film Memento uses artifacts like annotated polaroids and tattoos to extend his autobiographical 
memory. 
ii A reviewer pointed out that a difference between biological and artifactual memory is that artifactual 
can be more easily hacked than biological memory. In relation to the dimension of autobiographical 
dependency, it is noteworthy to point out that the higher the dependency on the object, the more 
vulnerable we are to hacking and manipulation of our extended memories. This has consequences for 
informational privacy and other moral values.  
